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Abstract
This paper analyzes the dynamics of health insurance coverage, health expenditures, and health
status in the decade expanding from 1992 to 2002, for a cohort of older Americans. We follow
13,594 individuals interviewed in Waves 1 to 6 of the Health and Retirement Study, most of
whom were born between 1930 and 1940, as they transition from work into retirement. Al-
though this “depression cohort” is by and large fairly well prepared for retirement in terms
of pension coverage and savings, we identify signiﬁcant gaps in their health insurance cover-
age, especially among the most disadvantaged members of this cohort. We ﬁnd that govern-
ment health insurance programs—particularly Medicare and Medicaid—signiﬁcantly reduce
the number of individuals who are uninsured and the risks of large out of pocket health care
costs. However, prior to retirement large numbers of these respondents were uninsured, nearly
18% at the ﬁrst survey in 1992. Moreover, a much larger share, about 55% of this cohort, are
transitorily uninsured, that is, they experience one or more spells, lasting from several months
to several years, without health insurance coverage. We also identify a much smaller group of
persistently uninsured individuals, and show that this group has signiﬁcantly less wealth, and
higher rates of poverty, unemployment, and health problems, disability, and higher mortality
rates than the rest of the members of the cohort under study. We provide evidence that lack
of health insurance coverage is correlated with reduced utilization of health care services; for
example, respondents with no health insurance visit the doctor one fourth as often as those
with private insurance and are also more likely to report declines in health status. We also
analyze the components of out of pocket health care costs, and show that prescription drug
costs constituted a rapidly rising share of the overall cost of health care during the period of
analysis.
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Access to health insurance has become one of the single most important aspects considered by in-
dividuals when making employment and labor force participation decisions, including retirement.
The role of the government programs—Medicare and Medicaid—in these decisions is crucial for
understanding the behavior of older Americans as they try to balance career decisions and life de-
cisions at a time when their health is deteriorating, and the costs of health care are rising without
end in sight. In this paper we portray the choices and constraints faced by a large and represen-
tative sample of older Americans as they approach retirement, and estimate the complex set of
relationships underlying the heterogeneous coverage, utilization, and behavior, explicit in the rich
HRS data we study.
This paper presents a descriptive empirical analysis of the dynamics of health insurance, health
expenditures, and health status.1 We use a panel of older individuals, tracked over the decade
between 1992 and 2002, as they transition from work into retirement. We study a cohort of 13,594
individuals, most of whom born between 1930 and 1940, who were surveyed in one or more of
the ﬁrst six waves of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).2 The median age of individuals
in the ﬁrst survey wave was 55, and although there was signiﬁcant attrition in subsequent waves,
the median age in the sixth wave was 65. Thus, the HRS permits us to follow this “depression
era” birth cohort over a key decade when most of these individuals were making the important
transition from work into retirement.
The beginning of the 1990s was a period of an unprecedented rapid escalation in health care
costs in the United States. Total per capita health care spending was rising at an unsustainable rate
of 11% per year at the beginning of the decade. However, a combination of factors—including
policies adopted under the Clinton administration that fostered the entry and growth of HMOs—
lead to a deceleration in the growth of health care costs, bottoming out at a growth rate of 4.6% per
year by 1998 (e.g. Ginsburg and Pickreign 1996), and with the average growth rate between 1993
1 See Currie and Madrian (1999) for a survery of the relationship between health insurance and labor market
behavior, and Blau and Gilleskie (2000) for a model of health insurance choices of older Americans.
2 The HRS is a survey conducted by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan and funded
by the National Institute on Aging. See Juster and Suzman (1995), Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier (1994 and
1995), or the HRS web page for additional information. The ﬁrst wave of the HRS was conductedbetween April 1992
and March 1993. The subsequent 5 waves were conducted at approximate two year intervals following the ﬁrst wave,
so that we can view HRS subjects as being interviewed (approximately)in the six even numbered years between 1992
and 2002.
1and 1999 standing at less than 1.9% (Glied 2003). Thereafter, a combination of factors, including
widespread failures and exits of HMOs, and huge increases in the prices of prescription drugs and
hospitaloutpatient services, lead to a renewed acceleration in the growthrate of health costs, which
peaked at 10% in 2001. Growth rates have moderated only slightly since then, to a rate of 8.2% in
2004 (Strunk and Ginsburg, 2004).
The average growth rate of health care costs has approximately doubled the rate of growth in
GDP, so it is not surprising that the ratio of total health care spending to GDP has risen steadily
over the 1990s, from about 12% of GDP in 1990 to nearly 15% of GDP by 2002 (US Department
of Census). The rapid growth in health care costs was matched by an even steeper increase in
health insurance premiumscharged to individualsand ﬁrms. For example, in 2004 employer health
insurance premiums increased by over 11%, nearly four times the rate of inﬂation (Kaiser Family
Foundation, September 2004).
As a result a growing number of U.S. ﬁrms, facing increasingly tough international competitive
pressures, have discontinued employer-provided health care plans during the last decade. This, in
turn, contributed to the growing number of U.S. citizens (approximately 45 million today) without
health care coverage. For example, ﬁrms in industries such as textiles employ poorly educated
workers who are paid low wages, but they must compete against foreign imports from countries
suchas China, whoseworkersare paid evenlowerwages. Inother manufacturingindustriessuchas
autos, domestic automakers such as GM must pay high health care costs (approximately $1500 per
vehicle)toitsunionizedworkers. Themaincompetitors,the Japaneseautomakers, avoidthesehigh
costs since their workers are largely covered by Japan’s national health insurance plan. Although
it is not clear whether the decline in insurance coverage is driven mostly by the rapid growth in
health costs (Chernew, 2002), or by foreign competitive and cost-cutting pressures, it is clear that
both have contributed to the problem. According to Census ﬁgures, 13.9% of the U.S. population
had no form of health insurance in 1990. By 2002 this share had reached 15.2%.
With this background in mind, we study how the HRS cohort of “depression babies” has fared
over this same decade. There are plenty of anecdotal evidences that many members of this cohort
were permanently “scarred” by the Great Depression. In particular, memories of bare cupboards
and long unemployment lines may have instilled a stronger sense of frugality and a stronger sav-
ings motive relative to other cohorts, particularly the “baby boomers” who were raised in much
more bountiful times. In fact, a number of recent studies (Gustman and Steinmeier 1999, and
2Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun 2004), have concluded that the vast majority of the HRS co-
hort is quite well prepared ﬁnancially for their retirement years, having accumulated substantial
pension, housing, and ﬁnancial wealth that appears more than adequate to support them during
retirement. The paper by Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2004) shows that a calibrated version
of the classical “life-cycle model” in could explain over 85% of the accumulated wealth among
married households and over 70% of the variation in wealth among single households – far more
than can be explained by any other competing theory they examined.3
Our study can be viewed as addressing a closely related question: Are members of the HRS
cohort as equally well prepared for retirement in terms of their ability to handle risks of unexpected
healthcare costs? Alongwithrisksassociatedwithlossof incomedue tounemployment,disability,
ﬁnancial risks associated with ownership of housing (e.g. loss due to ﬁre, ﬂooding, etc.) and
other ﬁnancial risks (e.g. risky stock market returns), the risk of large uninsured health care costs
may constitute one of the biggest ﬁnancial risks facing members of the HRS cohort. Even if an
individual has accumulated a substantial level of retirement savings, these savings may not be
“adequate” if the person faces signiﬁcant risk that these savings may be depleted to cover the costs
of uninsured out-of-pocket health care expenditures. Catastrophic health events are quite common
and carry with them substantial costs (See French and Jones 2004 for an analysis of these events
using the same data set we are analyzing, and Feenberg and Skinner 1994 for an earlier analysis of
the dynamics of health care expenditures, withan emphasis on the persistence of those catastrophic
events, using a panel of tax returns).
A variety of sources of evidence suggest that the risk associated with uninsured health care
costs is a major concern for many Americans, particularly among older Americans approaching
retirement. Almost 50% of the American public reports being worried about paying for health care
and/or health insurance, and 42% reports being worried about not being able to afford health care
services (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, October 2004). A recent study by Appelby (2005)
ﬁnds that 50% of all bankruptcy ﬁlings were partly a result of medical expenses. Approximately
50% of workers in low- to middle-wage jobs had problems paying medical bills in the past 12
months or were paying off medical debts (Commonwealth Fund, 2004). Furthermore, the double-
digit rates of increase in health insurance premiums have forced increasing numbers of Americans
3 They conclude that: “The fact that our predictions and the data closely align suggests two things. First, as
mentioned above, Americans are saving enough to maintain living standards in retirement. And second, the life-cycle
model provides a very good representation of behavior related to the accumulation of retirement wealth.” (p. 34).
3to forgo health insurance completely and “self insure” against such risks.
Indeed, a recent survey ﬁnds that the primary reason Americans are uninsured is because the
health insurance coverage is too expensive (Kaiser Family Foundation, November, 2004). An ear-
lier study by Rust and Phelan (1997) found that a signiﬁcant number of Americans are “health
insurance constrained”. While they would have liked to retire earlier than they do, the lack of
employer-provided retiree health beneﬁts forces a signiﬁcant number of them to continue working
for employers who provide health insurance coverage to their employees until they reach age 65
and are eligible for Medicare beneﬁts. Thus, Rust and Phelan concluded that an important expla-
nation for the “age 65 peak” in retirements is due to the interacting effect of incomplete private
health care coverage and government provided Medicare coverage.
Our empirical analysis suggests that a majority of individuals in the HRS have signiﬁcant
gaps in their health insurance coverage, and these gaps in coverage constitute a major ﬁnancial
risk, which could jeopardize their retirement savings, and their health and welfare before and after
retirement. We ﬁnd that the main gaps in coverage occur prior to age 65, at a time when individuals
are stillnot eligible for Medicare. We ﬁnd that Medicare, and to a lesser extent Medicaid, are major
“safety nets” that provide a relatively high level of security against health care costs to the vast
majority of the sample who are over 65. However, before age 65, we ﬁnd very striking differences
among the respondents of the HRS sample in terms of their degree of protection against health
care costs. We identify three main types of individuals in our sample: 1) those who are persistently
uninsured, 2) those who are transitorily uninsured and 3) those who are continuously insured.
The persistently uninsured are individuals who do not have any type of health insurance cov-
erage (not even through a spouse) at each survey wave that they are interviewed prior to turning
65 (when virtually all individuals in the HRS become eligible for Medicare beneﬁts). Fortunately,
the persistently uninsured constitute the smallest component of the HRS cohort: 549 of the 13,594
individuals, or 4%, of our sample. A surprising ﬁnding is that the group of transitorily uninsured
individuals constitutes 55% of our sample. That is, over half of the individuals in the HRS experi-
enced one or more spells without any form of health insurance coverage over the 10 years that we
followed them. Thus, the probability of being “temporarily uninsured” over a decade is more than
three times larger than the fraction of individuals who are uninsured at any particular point in time.
Finally, the group of continuously insured individuals constitutes about 40% of our sample.
When we analyze the characteristics of these three groups, we observe the huge divisions and
4inequalities separating the “haves” and the “have nots” that are quite common in our society. In
particular, there is a fairly clear ordering of the three groups in terms of economic resources, health
status, education, and overall socioeconomic status. Individuals who are persistently uninsured
are more likely to be non-white, female, singles, and they have signiﬁcantly lower education and
wages, and lower accumulated wealth than the other two groups. In fact, the mean total family
income for individuals in the persistently uninsured group is at or below the poverty line. These
individuals also have materially worse health status, and despite their signiﬁcantly lower income
and wealth, their out-of-pocket health care expenditures are about the same as those for the other
two, better insured, groups. Perhaps due to the need to cover these proportionately much larger
health care costs, individuals in the persistently uninsured group work longer and retire later than
those in the other two groups.
Individuals in the continuously insured group are, not surprisingly, the richest and most ﬁnan-
cially well prepared of the three groups. They are better educated, have signiﬁcantly higher wages,
and are employed at ﬁrms that are much more likely to offer health insurance beneﬁts, and even
retiree health insurance beneﬁts, than individuals in the other two groups. Furthermore, a variety
of different health indicators reveals that these individuals are signiﬁcantly healthier, and are more
likely to survive to old age compared to the others. In addition, perhaps due to their greater ﬁnan-
cial resources, individuals who are continuously insured have greater savings and are able to retire
earlier compared to the other two groups.
The transitorily uninsured have characteristics that are intermediate between the two other
groups. They have average levels of education, earnings, and moderate wealth accumulations.
They also have generally worse health compared to those who are continuously insured, but gen-
erally better health than those who are persistently uninsured. We do not yet fully understand the
reasons why individuals in this group are covered in some periods and not in others. Are the gaps
in coverage due to job changes, or is this evidence of “strategic timing” (i.e., purchasing insurance
during periods where an individual expects to have a high need for health care services and let-
ting policies lapse in periods where health care needs are expected to be lower)? In subsequent
versions of this paper we intend to provide more insight into these questions, which have consid-
erable importance to private insurance companies due to their implications for adverse selection
dynamics.
Overall, the results we have obtained so far highlight a characteristically American paradox.
5Individualswhoare continuouslyuninsuredare inmanyrespectstheleasthealthyof theindividuals
in the HRS survey. Yet, at the same time, they also have the least degree of access to medical
care—at least prior to age 65. Of course, this outcome is beneﬁcial to private insurance companies,
since it is consistent with “proﬁtable selection”, namely, the most generous health care coverage
is provided to those who need and use it the least. Whether this pattern of screening and sorting
is an intentional or unintentional outcome, in the end it serves to exacerbate the already large
pre-existing inequalities in income and wealth in the U.S. It contributes to the increasing degree
of inequality in the provision of health care, which, in turn, ampliﬁes the already wide existing
inequalities in health status and mortality.4
The main silver lining in our analysis is the powerful role played by Medicare, and to a lesser
extent Medicaid, in providing beneﬁts and a greater degree of security to individuals who lack
health insurance prior to being eligible for Medicare. We also observe self-reported measures of
satisfaction with the quality of and level of access to health care rising after becoming eligible for
Medicare, and we observe an increase in utilization of health care services (e.g. hospitalizations
and doctorvisits)after individualsbecome eligiblefor Medicare. Thismayreﬂect a degree of“pent
up” or deferred medical care that these individuals undertake once they are covered by insurance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed description
of the type of health care coverage that HRS respondents had in the 1992 to 2002 period. Sec-
tion 3 presents the estimates of a discrete choice econometric model of health insurance coverage
and health insurance transitions, with an emphasis on understanding the determinants of having
coverage through employers, having private insurance, or having no insurance. Section 4 ana-
lyzes the health care costs and health care utilization of HRS respondents. Section 5 provides
non-parametric density estimates of the out-of-pocket health expenditures in the sample. We also
present results of ﬁtting a Pareto distribution to these data. Section 6 summarizes our ﬁndings, and
concludes.
4 See Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000), and Williams and Cookson (2000) for surveys on issues of equity in
health and health care.
62 Descriptive Analysis of Health Care Coverage
In this section we explore the dynamics of health insurance coverage across waves of the HRS.
Speciﬁcally, we examine the most common combinations of coverages, and the characteristics of
the insured and uninsured respondents.
In general there are numerous insurance options available for the individuals in the data set.
However,inthispaperwecategorizetherespondentsintothefollowinginsuranceplans: (1)employer-
or former employer-provided insurance; (2) private health insurance; (3) Medicare; (4) Medicaid;
(5) Medigap; and (6) Champus, VA, and union health insurance plans.5
Figure 2.1 provides two snapshots of the distribution of health insurance coverage of the HRS
respondents. On the left hand the ﬁgure depicts the distribution at the very ﬁrst interview in 1992
(Wave 1), while the distribution on the right hand is for the latest available interview, namely in
2002 (Wave 6). The primary coverage is a mutually exclusive designation of the “most important
type of insurance coverage” for the HRS respondents who have multiple types of health insur-
ance coverage simultaneously. The primary health insurance plan was determined as the plan that
would provide the individual with the “best” possible beneﬁt (i.e., the highest degree of protection)
in the following order: (1) private health insurance (excluding Medigap), (2) employer-provided
insurance, (3) retiree or COBRA coverage from a former employer, (4) union, VA or Champus,
(5)“self-insurance”(includingMedicalsavingsaccounts), (6)MedicaidorMedicarewhoalsohave
Medigap, (7) Medicare only, (8) Medicaid only, and (9) the residual primary insurance category,
namely no insurance.
Figure 2.1 shows that there is a large fraction, i.e., 17%, of uninsured individuals in Wave 1 of
the HRS. This is signiﬁcantly larger than the fraction of uninsured individuals in the U.S., which
is about 13%. However, part of the reason for this apparent discrepancy is that the percentages in
Figure 2.1 are unweighted, and thus reﬂect the stratiﬁed nature of the HRS, which oversampled
minorities and individuals in lower income groups. Note that by Wave 6 (2002), the fraction
of the HRS sample who are uninsured was reduced by two thirds, to just 6% of the sample. One
explanationfor thislarge reduction isthe increased fractionof the HRS populationwhoare covered
by Medicare. This fraction increased from 4% in Wave 1 to 30% by Wave 6. The other reason
for this change is the dramatic decline in the employer-provided health plans, which dropped from
5 Champus stands for Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. VA refers to the Veterans
Administration.
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55% in 1992 to less than half, namely 25%, by 2002. However, this sharp drop also represents a
shift into health insurance from a former employer, which composes 25% of the sample in Wave 6.
Hence, the overall share of individuals covered by employer-provided health insurance, by current
or former employer (via retiree health insurance or COBRA coverage) decrease only slightly to
50%.
The large expansion in Medicare coverage and the reduction in individuals covered under the
health plan from a current employer simply reﬂects the aging of the HRS population. The HRS is
a panel of individuals, most of whom were below retirement age in Wave 1, but by Wave 6, the
majority of individuals had retired and a large proportion of them were over 65, and thus eligible
for Medicare beneﬁts. We can also observe that private insurance gets replaced by Medigap in
Wave 6. This happens largely because in Wave 1 respondents supplement their employer-provided
insurance with private insurance, while in Wave 6 respondents supplement Medicare with Medi-
gap. This idea is supported in Figure 2.2, in which we present the health coverage by employment
status of the respondents. This ﬁgure shows that the employer and private insurance combination
in Wave 1 is roughly the same as the Medicare and Medigap combination in Wave 6.
In Wave 1 of the HRS it is not possible to distinguish whether an individual was covered by
an employer-provided health insurance or by a retiree health insurance from a former employer.
However, we can infer that individuals who reported being retired and having employer-provided
health insurance are those covered under a retiree health insurance plan. Similarly, the HRS did not
speciﬁcally distinguish COBRA coverage.6 Thus, HRS respondents who report that they are not
6 The COBRA is operated under a government regulation that obligates employers who offer health insurance to
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Non−Exclusive Coverage Rates For Given Employment Status Wave 6
Figure 2.2: Health insurance coverage by respondent type: Waves 1 and 6
9working and not retired, but are being covered by insurance from an employer/former employer,
are covered by COBRA.
In addition to information on the source of insurance (e.g. employer, privately purchased plan,
government-providedplan, etc.), there are some distinctionsaboutthe speciﬁc type of the program.
That is, whether coverage is provided via an HMO (Health Maintenance Organization), whether it
is a POS (Point of Service Plan), PPO (Preferred Provider Organization), or FFS (Fee for Service).
Health insurance also differs in terms of the types of procedures covered (e.g. whether dental or
psychiatric treatments are covered), as well as in the level of deductibles and co-payment rates,
annual and lifetime maximums, and so forth.
Unfortunately, the HRS does not record information on most of these additional important de-
tails about the individual’s speciﬁc health insurance coverage. Also, starting in Wave 2, the survey
does distinguish whether the insurance is from an employer or former employer, and whether it
is an HMO, PPO, or FFS. Since our main initial focus is on the basic question of whether or not
individuals are covered by some type of health insurance, the analysis below ignores these various
distinctions altogether.
Medicare on the other hand is a relatively standardized government-providedplan, whose rules
and regulations are much better known. Speciﬁcally, there are two types of Medicare beneﬁts,
Medicare Part A (hospitalization insurance), which is available to all individuals over age 65 (and
disabled covered by the Social Security disability insurance after a two year waiting period), and
Medicare part B (doctor insurance), which is available to Medicare beneﬁciaries who also elect
to pay an additional premium. Waves 1 and 2 of the HRS did not collect information on whether
Medicare beneﬁciaries were covered under part A or parts A and B. However, this information is
available starting in Wave 3. In order to maintain consistency across waves of the HRS we do not
separately distinguish Medicare A and B coverage in the results reported below.
The HRS did record (in all waves) whether an individual was covered by a privately purchased
“Medigap” plan, or government-provided Medicaid insurance. Medicaid is a medical assistance
program for poor individuals and families, which has a strict means income and wealth tests. All
individualswho are eligible for the Supplemental Security Income beneﬁts (a program for disabled
adults and children who may not be eligible for Social Security disability beneﬁts) are also eligible
their employees to make this coverage available to employees who leave the ﬁrm for up to 36 months, provided the
former employee is willing to pay the full premium.
10for Medicaid. Medigap insurance is privately-provided insurance that is designed to supplement
Medicare beneﬁts, covering certain expenses and procedures that are not covered by Medicare.7
The HRS alsorecords whether a personis coveredby a Unionhealthplan, and byVA and Champus
insurance, which pays for civilian medical care provided to dependents of active duty, or retired,
Federal uniformed services personnel, and deceased of such personnel.
It is worth noting that the there are substantial differences in insurance coverage depending
on the employment status of the respondent. Figure 2.2 documents the insurance coverages of
different types of respondents in Waves 1 and 6.8 These categories are not mutually exclusive.
That is, individuals who have more than one type of insurance coverage, are included in every
insurance category that they are covered by. As a result, the lengths of the bars in these ﬁgures
exceed 100%. Note that all of the bars exceed 100%, which simply means that is quite common
among HRS respondents to have multiple types of coverage.
For example, respondents who are retired and those who are not employed typically have two
types of insurance coverage. In the case of retirees, the composition of coverage changed sig-
niﬁcantly between Waves 1 and 6. In Wave 1, the most common form of coverage is employer-
provided (including retiree) health insurance, while the next most common type of coverage is
Medicare. By Wave 6, Medicare has become the most common form of health insurance for re-
tirees, covering more than 70% of all retirees. After Medicare, the next two most common types of
coverage are the former employer and Medigap plans. For those individualswho are not employed
(including individuals who are retired and some are not yet consider themselves to be retired, but
who may have lost a job, and disabled individuals), employer-provided insurance (through CO-
BRA coverage) is the main type of coverage in Wave 1, whereas Medicare is the main type of
insurance in Wave 3.
The “employed” category we use here includes individuals who are ﬁrm-employed and self-
employed. In Wave 1, the self-employed have the second highest fraction of uninsured individuals
(second only to the disabled individuals). The fraction of self-employed individuals who are unin-
sureddecreases signiﬁcantlybyWave6, whichappears largelyduetotheexpansioninthecoverage
rates by Medicare and Medigap, and somewhat by the increased coverage by Champus and Union
7 Prior to the recent Medicare prescription drug bill, Medigap covered prescription drugs, certain procedures not
covered by Medicare, nursing home stays, and bills that exceed Medicare’s maximum coverage limits.
8 The number of disabled respondents are 54 and 28 in Waves 1 and 6, respectively, so the insurance breakdown
for this group must be interpreted with caution.








































Figure 2.3: Common Combinations
plans.
Overall, we see that the bars get longer from Wave 1 to Wave 6, mainly due to the increased
coverage by Medicare and other Medicare supplements. For all employment categories it appears
that the expansion in Medicare coverage rates is the biggest single factor accounting for the in-
creased coverage. At the same time, the fraction of individuals covered by employer-provided
insurance is signiﬁcantly lower. This apparent patterns stem from the fact that in Wave 1 most
HRS respondents were under 65, not retired, and employed, whereas by Wave 6, the majority of
respondents had already retired, were over 65, and were therefore eligible for Medicare coverage.
Figure 2.3 plots the insurance coverage combinations that exceed 1% of all possible combi-
nations observed in the data when averaged across all 6 waves.9 This covers approximately 62%
of the individuals in the HRS. Among all possible combinations employer-provided insurance
constitutes the largest fraction in the data. This may suggest that an average employer-provided
insurance is good enough, so that employees need not supplement it with other types of supple-
mental insurance. Note however, that Medicare is typically supplemented with some other plans,
such as Medigap, Former Employer plans, and Private insurance.
Table 1 compares the characteristics of insured and uninsured respondents in Waves 1 and
6.10 The category of uninsured is calculated as a residual. That is, a respondent is considered
9 In order to avoid double counting we ﬁnd the common combinations and their percentages separately for each
wave and then we average those percentages.
10 We exclude the missing values in order not to overstate the number of uninsured respondents.
12Table 1: Comparison of Insured and Uninsured Characteristics
Wave 1 Insured Wave 6 Insured Wave 1 Uninsured Wave 6 Uninsured
Average Age 54.3 64.7 46.6 60.8
% over 65 4.1% 52.0% 0.1% 0.7%
Mean Earnings $26,593.42 $9,845.53 $ 15,762.75 $7,459.98
Total Family Income $ 54,079.90 $49,162.14 $36,203.20 $ 27,936.16
Net Wealth $ 259,324.89 $ 358,944.13 $159,394.05 $ 115,389.76
% Male 48.2 44.4 40.9 31.8
% Female 51.8 55.6 59.1 68.2
% Married 82.8 71.7 78.2 58.6
% Single 17.2 28.3 21.8 41.4
Level of Education
% High School Diploma 33.3 30.7 25.7 24.0
% Vocational Training 24.6 22.2 21.6 20.4
% Associate Degree 3.6 3.4 2.5 1.8
% Bachelor 22.1 21.2 11.0 9.8
% Masters 5.1 5.1 2.1 1.3
% MBA 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.3
% Law/Professional 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.5
% Ph.D. 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.7
Employment Status
% Employed 67.5 39.1 60.7 49.7
% Self-Employed 11.4 9.2 15.2 14.7
% Firm-Employed 56.1 30.0 45.5 34.9
% Not employed 32.5 60.9 39.3 49.3
% Retired 14.0 47.7 5.6 19.9
Self-Reported Health
% Excellent Health 23.2 12.2 17.4 11.4
% Very Good Health 28.6 30.7 23.0 19.4
% Good Health 27.5 31.3 30.7 35.1
% Fair Health 13.2 18.1 18.8 25.0
% Poor Health 7.5 7.6 10.2 9.1
as uninsured if he/she does not provide information in the survey that he/she is insured. In the
insured category we combine all respondents with any type of insurance. Clearly, the insured and
uninsured are very different along several dimensions.
The uninsured are quite younger on average than the insured individuals. They also have
signiﬁcantly lower earnings, family income, and wealth. They are more likely to be female, single,
and somewhat less educated. In addition, they are more likely to be not employed, especially in
Wave 1 of the HRS. By Wave 6 a disproportional fraction of the uninsured individuals, relative
to the insured individuals, have retired and are eligible for Medicare. Hence the fraction of not


































































The Role of Medicare in Reducing the Number of Uninsured 
Individuals without Health Insurance
Households without Health Insurance
Individuals with Medicare Coverage
Figure 2.4: Fraction Uninsured by age and year, and the role of Medicare
employed declined relative to Wave 1.
Finally, the insured respondents are in better health condition than those who are uninsured.
For example, in 1992 only 12.2% of individuals in the latter group report that they are in excellent
health condition, whereas 23.2% of the insured individuals report themselves to be in excellent
health condition. This reporting is reversed somewhat for the good and fair health categories.
There are two opposing forces that determine the health status of the uninsured. First, while the
individuals in the latter group are generally younger, they are more likely to be short of resources
for maintainingtheir health and addressing health problems. In contrast there may be self-selection
bias in play. That is, healthy younger respondents may be able to “afford” being uninsured, since
they are less likely to have to incur high health care costs. Also, the uninsured in general tend to
have low income, lower education, and working in low skilled jobs. Consequently, these factors
might contribute to having poorer health than those in the insured group.
The left-hand panel of Figure 2.4 reports the share of respondents without insurance by age,
in each of the six HRS waves. One can clearly see the overwhelming effects of Medicare on the
uninsured. After age 65, when everyone universally qualiﬁes for Medicare, the share of uninsured
respondents is almost in every wave. This ﬁgure also indicates that there has not been a signiﬁcant
increase in the fraction of the uninsured individual who are over age 50. If it is true, as is widely
reported in the press, that the number of uninsured has grown signiﬁcantly over the last decade,
then that growth must be coming almost exclusively from younger people.
14The right-hand panel of Figure 2.4 shows the interaction between the Medicare coverage rate
and the fraction of uninsured respondents. It is ﬁrst important to note that the ﬁgure contains
the coverage rate of Medicare, not the share of respondents for which Medicare was the primary
source of insurance, as in Figure 2.1. As mentioned above, many of those with Medicare coverage
in Figure 2.1 also have additional sources of insurance. As can be clearly seen, the sharp decline in
theshareof respondentswithoutinsuranceismatchedwithanevensharperincrease inthecoverage
by Medicare. Given that the average age of the population at the beginning of the panel is in the
mid-ﬁfties, this is hardly surprising. The implication is that the sharp drop in the uninsured seen in
the HRS is driven by the fact that the HRS population is aging and become eligible for Medicare
coverage, and not by an overall increase in general access to health insurance in the population
as a whole. The ﬁgure reports the share of respondents lacking insurance, as well as the share
of households where all members lack insurance. Additional work, not reported here, indicates
that while there is considerable heterogeneity across households, in general either everyone in the
household is covered by some health insurance or no one is covered.
To better understand the difference between the insured and uninsured we deﬁned three groups
of individuals based on their insurance status. The three groups are: (1) persistently uninsured;
(2) continuously insured; and (3) transitorily uninsured. An individual belongs to the ﬁrst group
if in every survey wave where the individual was under age 65, and thus ineligible for Medicare,
he/shewere uninsured. Apersonisinthesecondgroup, i.e., isdeﬁned tobe“continuouslyinsured”
if in every survey wave he/she is insured, and, in addition, in Waves 3 through 6 he/she answered
“no” to the question whether the individual has been uninsured at any point since the previous
wave. Finally, a person is deﬁned to be “transitorily uninsured” if he/she is neither in the ﬁrst
group nor in the second. That is, the third group is merely a complement of the other two groups
in the full sample.
We have constructed dozens of variables for each of the three groups, and for the full sam-
ple, ranging from employment status, coverage by health insurance, family characteristics and a
comprehensive set of ADL and IADL indices. The picture is very clear, the three groups are very
different along almost every observable dimension. For brevity we do not present here the full
set of results. Rather, in Figures 2.5A through 2.5P we present a selected number of graphs that
illustrate the inherent differences between the insured, uninsured, and transitorily uninsured indi-
viduals. Note that we have chosen to communicate our main ﬁndings graphically. However, all
15of the key results we describe below also emerge from multivariate analyses (e.g. in regressions
and probit and logit estimations) that “hold constant” the effect of changes in other variables that
can sometimes confound (due to “omitted variables” biases for example) correlations or trends
observed in simple graphical analyses of the data.
Figure 2.5A depicts the fraction of individuals that are still in the sample in each of the six
waves of the HRS. Despite a fair degree of care, there is signiﬁcant attrition, with only 75 percent
of the overall sample frame from wave 1 participating in the survey at wave 6. Attrition due to
mortality is clearly not the fault of the HRS staff, but mortality is not the main reason for losing 25
percent of the sample by wave 6, instead it is due to “classical” attrition, i.e refusals and inability
to locate individuals who have moved between successive survey waves. Clearly, the transitorily
uninsured have the largest attrition rate, followed by the consistently uninsured group. In com-
plete contrast, there is very little attrition for the continuously insured group. There are several
explanations for this. First, mortality rates for these two groups are signiﬁcantly higher than for
the continuously insured. In addition, those who are continuously insured are substantially richer
and more likely to be homeowners and have stable career jobs than individuals in the other two
groups. This tends to reduce their geographic mobility, increasing the chance that HRS surveyors
are able to recontact respondents in each successive wave, whereas classical sample attrition is
higher for the former two groups largely due to reduced ﬁnancial stability (i.e. greater likelihood
of job change, greater likelihood of being a renter than an owner, greater likelihood of divorce or
widowhood, etc).
Figure 2.5B depicts the fraction of individuals that are married. As noted in the introduction,
the persistently uninsured and the transitorily uninsured are signiﬁcantly more likely to be single
compared to the continuously insured. Further, the fraction who are married declines more steeply
in waves 3, 4 and 5 compared to the continuously insured group, reﬂecting both higher rates of
widowhood due to higher mortality of spouses, and also increased rate of divorce and separation.
Thus, this panel is also consistent with a reduced level of stability for transitorily and persistently
insured individuals.
Figures 2.5Cand Dshowthefraction ofindividualswhoare employedand retired, respectively.
Obviously, since we are following individuals over a decade when the median age goes from 55
to 65, we observe a substantial number of retirements, which explains the steady decline in the
fraction who are employed, which is largely matched the the steady increase in the fraction who are
16Figure 2.5: Characteristics of the Insured and Uninsured, by Wave
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18retired. The most striking feature is that the employment rates of persistently uninsured individuals
are signiﬁcantly lower, yet at the same time, the fraction of these individuals who are retired
are uniformly below the corresponding fraction of continuously insured individuals. The “gap”
between these two fractions is explained in part by unemployment, i.e. individuals who are not yet
retired, but who are also not working and are searching for a job due to involuntary or voluntary
unemployment. Note that by Wave 6 there is very little difference between the employment rates
for the persistently insured and individuals in the other two groups. This is partly due to the fact
that persistently uninsured individuals are more likely to retire as soon as they are eligible for
Medicare.
Figure 2.5E shows the fraction of self-employed individuals. It demonstrates that the persis-
tently uninsured are a lot more likely to be self-employed, and more so for the earlier waves. A
number of other studies have noted the problems by self-employed individuals in obtaining cov-
erage at a fair price, which is in contrast to the higher degree of “clout” that larger ﬁrms have in
obtaining more favorable group health insurance rates. As a result, individuals who are employed
by ﬁrms are more likely to have health insurance coverage than those who are self-employed. So
the higher propensity of persistently and to a lesser extent transitorily uninsured individuals to be
self-employed relative to continuously insured individuals is likely to be part of the reason why
individuals in the former two groups are uninsured.
Figure 2.5F shows that the trend in Medicare coverage is very similar for all the ﬁrst two
groups, but steeper for the persistently uninsured. This is consistent with what have already been
indicated above, that is, that the persistently uninsured are more likely to retire earlier, when (if
they are over 65) they are also eligible for Medicare.
Figures 2.5G and H show that the persistently uninsured are less likely to be supported by dis-
ability beneﬁts from the SSA. This seems ironic, since as we show shortly, by virtually all metrics,
individuals who are persistently uninsured are signiﬁcantly less healthy. Panel H shows that with
the exception of Wave 1 (where the transitorily uninsured are 50% more likely to apply for bene-
ﬁts than the persistently uninsured), the overall propensity for persistently uninsured individualsto
apply for SSI and SSDI beneﬁts is at least as high as the other two groups. Thus, there is evidence
that certain eligibility restrictions may be responsible for the lower degree of success of persis-
tently uninsured in gaining access to disability beneﬁts, which after a waiting period, also confers
disabled individuals access to Medicaid and Medicare beneﬁts.
19Figures 2.5I and 2.5J provide information about the self-reported health measure. As is clearly
apparent, the persistently and transitorily uninsured are more likely to report that they are in poor
health and are less likely to report that they are in excellent health condition relative to their coun-
terparts who are continuously insured. Figure 2.5K is consistent with Figures 2.5I and 2.5J, in that
the uninsured, especially the persistently uninsured, are not as optimistic about their probability of
livingto the age of 75 as the continuouslyinsured individuals. The may also reﬂect the fact that the
uninsured realize that not being covered by a health insurance signiﬁcantly reduces their ability to
maintain good health condition for themselves. In addition, Figure 2.5L shows that the persistently
uninsured have far fewer doctor visits that the other two groups. An interesting observation is that
while they increase the number of doctor visits by Wave 6, a substantial gap remains relative to
the other groups. This might be indicating that even though by Wave 6 they can actually afford
more visits, since they are covered by Medicare, they care less about maintenance of their health.
This, in turn, may be the reason for them not to obtain health insurance to begin with. In related
evidence (not shown here) we also found that this group is also more likely to be engaged in haz-
ardous activity, namely smoking, and a lot more than those who are continuously insured. Maybe
as a result they have, on average, more problems conducting routine ADL’s, such as walking up
the stairs.
Figures 2.5M and 2.5N clearly demonstrates the persistently uninsured individuals have much
lower annual family income and household net worth than their continuously insured counterparts.
The transitorily uninsured are, naturally, in between the two groups. As we move to Wave 6 of
the HRS the gap in income shrinks some. This a result that the persistently uninsured retire earlier
and get OA beneﬁts that are close to their income prior to retirement. The persistently insured
individuals lose signiﬁcant amount of income when they retire. Nevertheless, they can afford it
because of their accumulation of wealth. As is evident from Figure 2.5N. Furthermore, the gap in
household net wealth between the insured and uninsured individuals gets larger for the later waves
of the HRS.
The last two ﬁgures, Figure 2.5O and Figure 2.5P, provide information on heath care cost and
utilization. Figure 2.5O shows that in the earlier waves of the HRS the out-of-pocket expenses
are roughly the same for all groups. But there is a huge gap in Wave 6 when the persistently
uninsured have much lower median out-of-pocket costs. Figure 2.5P indicates that the fraction
of continuously insured experience relatively high rate (over 6% in all waves) lapse of policy
20Table 2: Health Insurance Transitions
Waves 1-2 Waves 2-3 Waves 3-4 Waves 4-5 Waves 5-6
Ins. Unins. Ins. Unins. Ins. Unins. Ins. Unins. Ins. Uninsur.
Insured 88.76 11.24 91.93 8.07 95.00 5.00 97.45 2.55 97.45 2.55
Uninsured 40.83 59.17 63.52 36.48 46.49 53.51 60.54 39.46 50.15 49.85
coverage. We return to these last two issues below, in the discussion of the cost and utilization of
health insurance.
Having established that there are systematic differences between the insured and uninsured,
we next address the question: To what extent the two states of the world are persistent? Table 2
provides the transitions between the insured and uninsured states for every two consecutive waves
of the HRS. The table clearly indicates the very high persistent of the former state. That is, in-
dividuals who have health insurance tend to keep their coverage in the next wave with very high
probability; more than 85% percent between any two waves. Moreover, this probability increase
with time, which probably is due to the fact that more individuals in the sample are being eligible
for Medicare. Another interesting result is that individuals that are uninsured have high probabil-
ity, of 40% or more (50% on average) of becoming insured in the next wave. While this ﬁnding
indicates that the uninsured state is certainly not an absorbing state of nature, there is a signiﬁcant
probability that they will remain in the uninsured state.
3 An Econometric Analysis of Health Insurance Choice
Ideally one would like to be able to determine the most preferred insurance plans for a given
respondent. However, the choice of a particular plan is constrained by some important factors,
such as the employment status of the respondent, his/her family characteristics that deﬁne the need
for a particular plan, or more generally, a set of budget constraints. This makes it impossible to
determine the absolute preferences for a set of health insurance plans. Instead, we devote this
section to investigating the likelihood that a respondent has, or will have, a given insurance plan
conditional on a number of observed factors. Speciﬁcally, we use the well-known logit model to
evaluate the importance of the various factors discussed above in making the decision regarding
the health insurance to purchase, if at all. We conduct a number of exploratory regression that are
21Table 3: Logit Model for Contemporaneous Private Insurance
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* : coefﬁcients signiﬁcant a the 5 % level or better
designed to shed light on the nature of insurance coverage, the factors determining the probability
of being in a particular state, namely insured and uninsured states, and the factors determining the
transition between these two states.
Table 3 provides the results of a logit regression of current private insurance on a set of ex-
planatory variables. For the most part the results are consistent with our prior expectations. In
particular, the older an individual is, the more likely he/she is to purchase a private insurance. As
we have already documented above, individuals do supplement their other insurance coverage, in-
cluding the Medicare insurance, with private health insurance. However, the marginal effect is not
very large.
In the regression we distinguish between those who have positive net wealth and those who are
in debt (i.e., have negative wealth). We see that the higher the positive net wealth, or the smaller
the debt, the more likely is the individual to have a private insurance. However, the income effect,
although not statistically signiﬁcant, seems to have the wrong sign, as is the case with the spouse
income.
Respondents who currently have employer-provided health insurance or Medicaid are less
22likely to also have private insurance. Note that the marginal effect of having an employer-provided
insurance is very large, indicating that on average these plans provide sufﬁcient coverage that the
average individual need not supplement with a purchase of private insurance. The coefﬁcients for
the dummy variable for being a male is negative, indicating the males are less likely to have a
private insurance. The coefﬁcient on self-reported health status is also negative and signiﬁcant,
suggesting that healthier individuals are more likely to have a private insurance. The coefﬁcient
on total out-of-pocket health costs is positive but insigniﬁcant. The point estimate suggests though
that higherout-of-pocket expensesleads individualsto purchase privateinsurance, but the marginal
effect of these expenses are negligible. Also, hospital stay have positive effect on the probability
that a person has a privately owned insurance plan, but that may simply mean that those who have
private coverage tend to use it more for things like hospital stays which are relatively expensive.
One key problem with the estimation provided in the previous table is the question of timing.
Includinginthe regressioncontemporaneousinsurance statusand out-of-pockethealthcostsmakes
it harder identify the causal link and hence to determine whether higher health costs leads to enroll-
ment in a private insurance program. To address this issue we also regressed the private insurance
status from the next wave of interviews on current observed variables. The results, presented in
Table 4, are largely insigniﬁcant. In fact most of the coefﬁcients, except for Medicaid, that were
signiﬁcant in the estimation presented above remain signiﬁcant. However, this is understandable,
both because of the fact that the sample size shrinks dramatically, and the fact that two full years
elapse between two consecutive waves.
Few key results are worth mentioning. The coefﬁcient on the dummy variable on whether the
person has a health condition limiting his/her ability to work is negative and signiﬁcant. This re-
ﬂects the fact that this health condition is a pre-existing condition that limits the access to private
health insurance. More importantly, the coefﬁcient on total out-of-pocket health costs is also sig-
niﬁcant and is positive. This is consistent with the hypothesis that high out-of-pocket health costs
provide a strong incentive for respondents to seek for private insurance in order to defray those
expenses.
One ofthe mostchallengingobstaclesinmodelingaccess tohealthinsuranceistheendogeneity
and related problems that are associated with adverse selection. Healthier individuals who do not
anticipate high future health costs may consequently choose not to acquire insurance. In contrast
individuals with poor health conditions might anticipate high future health costs, and are therefore
23Table 4: Logit Model for Next Period Private Insurance
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard Error Marginal Effects
Constant 3.069922 6.243913 0.087091
Age -0.169681 0.200191 -0.000165
Age Squared 0.001590 0.001613 0.000001
Male 0.161755 0.224193 0.012624
Self Reported Health -0.096464 0.102485 -0.009021
Hospital Stays -0.047491 0.100099 -0.003675
Doctor Visits 0.004026 0.009073 0.000300
Log, Positive Wealth 0.058444 0.053856 0.004166
Log, Negative Wealth 0.109481 0.149882 0.008638
Log, Income 0.006505 0.075346 0.000500
Log, Spouse Income 0.014579 0.094045 0.001124




Medicare 0.207978 0.245716 0.015997












* : coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at the 5 % level or better
more likely to want to purchase health insurance.
In the next set of regressions we make an attempt to address some of these problems in two dif-
ferent ways. First, the regressions make an attempt at explaining the transition probability between
different insurance statuses. Speciﬁcally, the regression does not provide estimates for the likeli-
hood that an individualhas at some speciﬁc pointin time insurance coverage. Rather the regression
provide estimates for the probability that a person with insurance coverage loses his/her coverage
and the probability that an individual without insurance coverage will gain one. By observing the
changes in insurance status we are able to explore not just why households have insurance, but also
why they might change their insurance.
The second element that is introduce makes an attempt to control for the sample selection bias
discussed above. Variables such as the current number of doctor visits and hospital stays are used
as a proxy for future health costs. Since health statuses are relatively persistent states of nature,
current consumption of health care services provide an excellent predictor for future consumption
of health care. However, we should be cautious in interpreting the results, because doctor visits
and hospital stays might also be endogenous. The models explore the effect of some observed
24individual characteristics, such as income, age, wealth, education, marital status, sex, and race,
affect the transition between different insurance statuses.
Table 5 reports the results for a logit model on the transition of a household between being
covered by an insurance policy and being uninsured by the next interview date. Table 6 models
the opposite transition, that is that transition from that state in which a household is not covered by
health insurance to the state in which it is covered by the next interview date.
The results reported in the two tables indicate that current insurance status plays a major role in
determining whether or not an individual is likely to lose health insurance coverage. Speciﬁcally,
HRS respondents who are covered by Medicare, Medicaid or employer-provided health insurance
are far less likely to lose their insurance by the next interview date. This simply reﬂect the persis-
tence in the insured state that we have documented above, and the marginal effect of these factors
are very large relative to the overall average probability of losing an insurance coverage.
The results presented here also provide further evidence of the close link between job status
and insurance status. The variables representing employment transitions play an important role in
predicting loss of health insurance coverage. For example, entering unemployment is associated
with greater likelihood of losing insurance coverage. In fact, losing a job more than doubles the
probability of losing one’s insurance coverage. However, as can be seen from the coefﬁcient on
the transition from unemployment to employment, that transition also has a positive association
with the probability of losing the insurance coverage. This may indicate that ﬁnding a job need
not automatically imply that health insurance is provided. In fact, this result implies that ceteris
paribus individual who are covered by an insurance are more likely to lose it once they get a job.
Alternatively, it may reﬂect a simple problem of timing. The transitions considered here are over a
two year time span and it is unclear if the respondents ﬁrst lost their insurance, and then got a job
or ﬁrst got a job and then lost their insurance. A closer examination of these speciﬁc respondents
indicate that they are predominantly poor, lower income, married women, who are re-entering the
work force. These re-entries into the labor force may very well be secondary wage earners in
their households who are returning to the work force in response to loss of the household health
insurance.
The sign on the transition to retirement is also positive and signiﬁcant, with a rather large
marginal effect, implying that respondents are more likely to lose their insurance when they retire,
supposedly because they are too young to qualify for Medicare. Interestingly, as can be seen from
25Table 5: Logit Model for Loss of Insurance




















































Remained Unemployed 0.079707 0.074804 0.004056







































McFadden’s Likelihood Ratio Index 0.084645029
* : coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at the 5 % level or better
26Table 6: Logit Model for Gain of Insurance









































Entered Unemployment 0.143930 0.103790 0.033300
Left Unemployment 0.074574 0.114076 0.017244
Remained Unemployed 0.096635 0.071900 0.022322













Vocational Training -0.067722 0.061120 -0.015618
College Degree 0.303988 0.091010 0.070660
Professional Degree 0.178937 0.150308 0.041489




McFadden’s Likelihood Ratio Index 0.054374414
* : coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at the 5 % level or better
27Table 6 for respondents who are currently uninsured, retirement increases the chances of gaining
insurance. This seems to imply that uninsured households have an incentive to keep working
until they qualify for Medicare, in line with the ﬁndings of Rust and Phelan (1997) using the
Retirement History Survey. Overall, the results in Table 6 regarding the effect of job transition on
the probability of gaining insurance are generally weaker that those in Table 5.
The model indicates that a male is more likely to lose their insurance, while married respon-
dents are less likely to lose their insurance. However, the results also indicate that males and
married individuals are more likely to gain insurance if the are uninsured. Respondents whose
spouses have no insurance are also more likely to lose their insurance and are also less likely to
gain an insurance when they are uninsured. Clearly, it is difﬁcult to interpret these results and
attribute to them causal effects. Nevertheless, they seem to suggest the need for modeling the joint
decision within the household regarding labor supply and health insurance decisions. While this is
beyond the scope of this paper it will be examined in future work.
Age is signiﬁcant in explaining both the probability of gaining and losing insurance. As re-
spondents age those with no insurance are more likely to gain coverage, with the effect increasing
with age. Those with insurance are increasingly more likely to lose their insurance, with the ef-
fect decreasing with age. The fact that the probability of gaining insured status increases with
age represents the shift of old enough respondents to being covered by Medicare. The increased
probability of losing an insurance represents the fact that older individuals are more likely to lose
their job, along with their health insurance, but they are not old enough to qualify for Medicare.
Note also that family ﬁnancial variables are of prime importance. Insured wealthier respon-
dents are less likely to lose their insurance and uninsured wealthier respondents are more likely to
gain insurance. The results for the family income variable are somewhat counter-intuitive. Individ-
uals with higher income are more likely to lose their insurance and less likely to gain insurance if
they do not already have one. However, this may indicate that higher income is used as a substitute
for health insurance. That is, individualwith higher income can afford to give up their health insur-
ance, or not acquire one, in order, maybe, to increase contemporaneous consumption. A relatively
healthy respondent, with no anticipated jumps in health care costs, may rationally chose to forgo
paying premiums for health care if they can purchase some minimum level of health care services
for less money than the alternative option of buying insurance.
The results for the two models also provide some supportive additional evidence for the pres-
28ence of self-selection in health insurance. An increase in the number of hospital stays signiﬁcantly
decreases the odds of losing and gaining insurance. The number of doctor visits decreases the
probability of losing an insurance, but it increases the chances for gaining insurance. This implies
that a respondent who may anticipate higher future medical costs, will adjust his/her insurance
coverage accordingly. Note also that respondents with poor levels of self-reported health reduces
the chance of the uninsured gaining insurance. This may reﬂect the difﬁculty that respondents with
signiﬁcant pre-existing conditions might be facing in acquiring health insurance.
The results also indicate that there are some difference in accessing health insurance across
black and whites, and education levels. White respondents and those with high school diplomas
are both less likely to lose their health insurance and more likely to gain coverage. Also having
college or professional degree increases the ability to retain coverage. These results imply that
under-educated minorities have limited access to health insurance relative to the more highly ed-
ucated white counterparts, even after controlling for family background variable such as income
and wealth, and self-selection.
One possibleexplanationof these resultsis discrimination. Health care providersand insurance
companies may be rationing their services to minority and under-educated individuals. This may
reﬂect what is referred to as “taste” discriminationor simply“statistical”discrimination, especially
when we consider differences across education groups, reﬂecting the economic incentives of
insurance companies to ration their policies. This rationing behavior could take the form of deny-
ing coverage, or more subtly, a restriction on provision in areas with a higher concentration of
minorities and under-educated.
An alternative, and perhaps more plausible explanation, may lie in the quality of the jobs held
by individualsin these groups. Since compensationconsistsof both salary and beneﬁts. companies
may reward workers who have a higher education with both a higher wage and better beneﬁts,
including health care coverage. The implication is that when comparing the effects of education
on life-time earnings, the increases access to health care and other non-wage beneﬁts should be
accounted for as well.
294 Analysis of Health Care Costs and Health Care Utilization
In this section we analyze the costs and utilization of health care for the six waves of the HRS.
Health care costs are divided into health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket health expenses.
The latter are further divided into hospital costs, doctor costs, special services, and prescription
drugs. In the case of health care utilization, we will focus mostly on the annual number of doctor
visits and the annual number of hospital stays (in days). We then analyze the connection between
health coverage and health outcomes, mostly based on self-reported variables in the HRS, which
include self-reported health, health precluding ability to work, health limiting ability to work and
health limiting ability in general, among others.
4.1 Analysis of Health Care Costs
Table7 reportsthemeanand medianof out-of-pocketexpensesbroken downbycomponentsacross
the four most recent waves of the HRS.11 The average total out-of-pocket health expenditures is
an average of the sum of all the individual components. We can see that the average out-of-pocket
expenditures for the individuals in the sample did not change much between 1996 (Wave 3 of the
HRS) and 2000 (Wave 5), but increased signiﬁcantly after that, with the average values changing
much more dramatically than the median, indicating that some individuals incurred very large out-
of-pocket expenses in the last available interview of the HRS. The median average out-of-pocket
expenditures rose steadily during the period of analysis, for a total increase of 85% over the six-
year period from 1996 to 2002. Looking at the trends in the individual components, we observe
that between 1996 and 2000 hospital and nursing home costs decreased sharply, while the rest of
the components either decreased of stayed around their values as of 1996. One of the main changes
driving the overall trend of the aggregate measure is the large drug cost increase between the 2000
interview and the 2002 interview, namely 169% and 27% for the average and median, respectively.
The rest of the components increased more moderately over the same period.
The upper-left-hand side panel of Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of total out-of-pocket health
costs, illustrating graphically the evidence from Table 7. Over the 1996 to 2000 period both the
average and the median remain fairly ﬂat, but it is in the last period that we see the major increases
11 Due to data limitations in the ﬁrst waves of the HRS, for this analysis we mostly use data from the 1996-2002
period, except when it is possible to recoverprevious information. In those cases we use data from all available waves.
30Table 7: Health Insurance Out-of-Pocket Expenditures (2004 US Dollars)
Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Nursing and Hospital Costs
Mean 1368.08 1414.17 1043.80 1602.14
Median 708.00 580.00 495.00 525.00
Doctor, Surgery and Dentists Costs
Mean 507.15 509.93 512.15 1287.03
Median 242.00 232.00 220.00 262.50
Drug Costs
Mean 1073.85 808.82 825.16 2217.75
Median 290.40 278.40 396.00 504.00
Home Care and Special Services Costs
Mean 515.84 428.77 553.68 1052.23
Median 151.25 116.00 110.00 130.99
Average Total Out-of-Pocket Expenditures
Mean 1207.55 1077.33 1098.70 3045.24
Median 423.50 445.44 533.50 781.20
in both the mean and the median of out-of-pocket expenses. The upper-right-hand side panel
presents the total out-of-pocket health costs by age. We can see that it is increasing with age up to
around age 70, when it reaches $2400. The median of out-of-pocket costs are much ﬂatter with a
peak just above $500, also around age 70. This suggests that the behavior of the average is driven
by a relatively small number of individuals with very large out-of-pocket expenses, something
expected and well documented given the very nature of the health uncertainties and heterogeneous
coverage of expenses of this population (e.g. Roos, Shapiro, and Tate 1989, Berk and Monheit
1992 and 2001, Eichner, McClellan, and Wise 1998, and Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000).
The lower panels of Figure 4.1 show the median out-of-pocket health care costs broken into
hospital, doctor, drugs, and special costs, over time and by age. From the lower-left-hand side
panel the most striking result is the combination of falling hospital costs and sharply increasing
prescription drugs costs, as we have already documented above. The lower-right-hand side panel
shows the same analysis by age. The median hospital costs are the largest and most volatile com-
ponent of the health care costs, especially for relatively younger workers, likely reﬂecting some
catastrophic health events affecting these individuals. However, these results have to be taken with
some caution, since our sample is only representative of the older age groups of the population.
These costs oscillatearound an average amountof about $600, and then drop sharply as individuals
enter Medicare in their 60s. At the same time drug costs follow an increasing trend that peaks at
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Figure 4.1: Health Care Costs by Year and Age








































































Figure 4.2: Total Premiums by Year and Age
around age 69. All other costs drop sharply when individuals reach retirement ages.
Figure 4.2 depicts the average and median total premium value over time and by age. The
total premium is the sum of Medicare, employer-provided insurance, Medigap and private health
insurance premiums. From the left-hand panel, we observe that the average premium oscillates
around the same values during the 1994-2000 period, going from $2000 in 1994 to slightly below
that in 2000. The average premium increases then to around $2250 by 2002. The median total
premium value follows a similar trend, with an initial value of just below $1400 in 1994, and
almost $1600 by 2002. Looking at the premium values by age, we see in the right-hand panel
of the ﬁgure that the average premium is slightly increasing with age up to around age 62. After
that it decreases sharply between the ages of 62 and 65 and then increases for individuals age 66
to 70, only to drop sharply again around age 70. We believe that these ﬂuctuations are connected
with the labor supply behavior of individuals responding to the incentives provided by the Social
Security system, since a large proportion of individuals join Medicare at around age 65, and then
again around age 70, when no more actuarial adjustments to beneﬁts are possible.
Table 8 shows the detailed health insurance premiums broken down by health insurance type.
All values are in 2004 US dollars. We can see that Medicare premiums did not change very much
between Waves 2 and 5 (1994 to 2000), but increased signiﬁcantly between Waves 5 and 6.12.
12 The HRS does not contain explicit information on Medicare premiums in Wave 2, since there is no question
asking how much an individual that is covered by Medicare pays exclusively on Medicare premium.
33Table 8: Health Insurance Premiums (2004 US Dollars)
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Medicare Premium (#) — 203 211 468 1050
Mean — 844.09 838.27 726.47 1022.26
Median — 609.84 612.48 594.00 680.40
Employer Premium (#) 3262 1941 1601 1312.00 2861
Mean 1928.67 1393.24 1310.29 1520.98 2150.19
Median 1228.80 847.00 835.20 943.80 1512.00
Medigap Premium (#) 110 336 558 742 1701
Mean 1188.04 1483.30 1405.08 1698.71 1999.88
Median 921.60 1205.16 1251.64 1320.00 1600.20
Private Premium (excl. Medigap)(#) 1167 743 714 525 1244
Mean 2168.10 3300.48 3512.64 3552.35 2405.30
Median 1290.24 2904.00 3004.40 3036.00 1728.30
Long Term Care Premium (#) 52 602 534 623 773
Mean 1155.30 1418.00 1502.27 2527.44 4104.01
Median 928.00 847.00 1044.00 1214.40 1827.00
Total Premium (#) 4208 4205 4005 4244 4880
Mean 2050.33 1940.38 1833.34 1971.00 2250.48
Median 1249.28 1258.40 1252.80 1293.60 1575.00
On the other hand, Medigap premiums increased steadily over the same period, with the sharpest
increases in the 1998 to 2002 period. Employer-provide health insurance premiums decreased
between Waves 2 and 4, and increased steadily there after, for an overall increase of 12%. We
also calculated Wave 6 (2002) employer-provide health insurance premium to be $2,150.19, which
is very close to what the Kaiser Family Foundation survey of employer health beneﬁts found for
2003, namely $2,412.
Averageprivateinsurancepremiums(notincludingMedigap)increasedsteadilyfrom$2,168.10
in Wave 2 to $3,552.35 in Wave 5, then decreased sharply to $2,405.30 in Wave 6. Long-term care
premiums increased monotonically between Waves 2 and 4, and very rapidly there after, with the
data showing a large increase in the mean and median premiums between Waves 5 and 6 (62%
and 51%, respectively), which could be reﬂecting the changes made recently in the long-term care
ﬁnancial system.
It is interesting to notice that as our sample ages, more individuals are reporting positive Medi-
care, Medigap, and long-term care health insurance premiums and less employer-provided insur-
ance premiums. The fact that more and more individuals are becoming eligible for Medicare, and
Medicare premiums are relatively lower than employer premiums, and much lower than all private







































Figure 4.3: Total Premiums by Wave and Age Group
insurance premiums, explain why we are not seeing a large increase in the average total premium
across waves.
It would be natural to conjecture that the trends that we observe in terms of health care pre-
miums are driven by the aging process of our sample. However, Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present a
fairly different picture. The different types of premiums do not follow a clear age trend, and are
dominated by the time trend, mainly through the increasing premiums in the last sample years.
The exception is the private insurance premiums plotted in the lower-left-hand side of Figure 4.4,
which show an increases in premiums up to age 65 in all waves. After age 65 there is a large drop
due to the fact that a large number of individuals join Medicare, and those that keep using private
insurance are precisely those that are paying the least for their insurance coverage, maybe because
they are comparatively healthier. Finally, long-term care premiums do grow after age 60, but the
sharp increases in premiums in the 2000 and 2002 waves, dominates the age effect.



























































































































































Figure 4.4: Premiums by Year and Age
364.2 Health Care Utilization and Effects on Health
In analyzing health care utilization we mainly focus on the annual number of doctor visits and the
annual number of hospital stays (in days). Our analysis of health outcomes is mostly based on
the self-reported variables in the HRS. Table 9 provides information on self-reported health and
health care utilization by wave. It presents four different measures of self-reported health: health
limitation precludes work, health limits ability to work, health limits ability in general and average
self-reported health. It also includes two measures of self-reported life expectancy: belief to be
alive until 75 years old and belief to be alive until 85 years old.
Not surprisingly, we observe that as our sample ages, more people report health affecting their
ability to work and their ability in general. Also, the average self-reported health declines by about
14% over the period of study. Breaking down self-reported health by ﬁve categories: excellent,
very good, good, fair and poor, we can observe some interesting patterns. The number of people
reporting to have very good, good and poor health ﬂuctuates somewhat but does not change much
over the period. However, the number of people reporting to be in excellent health decrease from
about 22% to about 11%, while the number of people reporting to be in fair health increased from
14% to 17.5%. The fraction of people that self-reports they expect to be alive by age 75 almost
does not change across waves. Very similar patter happens to the percentage of people that self-
report expecting to be alive by age 85, except for the last two waves, in which there is a 16%
increase. This is mainly due to selection in that those individuals that survive long enough to reach
Wave 6 are closer to age 85 than they were in Wave 1, and they are also more likely to be healthier.
Health care utilization is broken down by average hospital stays (in days) and average number
of doctor visits. The average hospitalization stay increased from 2.11, in Wave 1, to 3.44 days in
Wave 6, and the average number of doctor visits increased from 3.63, in Wave 1, to 8.23 in Wave
6. This increase in the utilization of health care services seems natural since our sample is aging,
but it is also connected with the type of insurance they have as they age.
Table 10 provides information on self-reported health by level of coverage. The HRS has
information on the level of coverage only conditional on reporting the use of health care service.
So thenumbersinTable 10are calculatedacross wavesand conditionalonthe individualsreporting
that they have used health care service. It is interesting to notice that among those who reported
having some health limitation, 90% were fully or partially covered. Also, for those who reported
having fair or poor health, more people were fully covered in comparison with those who reported
37Table 9: Self-Reported Health and Health Care Utilization
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Health Limitation Precludes Work (%) 9.22 14.30 14.33 15.31 15.21 10.05
Health Limits Ability to Work (%) 21.48 25.55 25.83 25.76 26.27 26.30
Health Limits Ability in general (%) 29.41 32.01 32.42 32.23 32.66 32.81
Average Self-Reported Health
(1=Excellent, 5=Poor) 2.43 2.53 2.53 2.76 2.69 2.77
Report Health as Excellent (%) 22.19 18.12 17.49 12.20 13.15 11.45
Report Health as Very Good (%) 27.51 29.14 30.54 26.84 28.99 28.24
Report Health as Good (%) 28.01 28.75 27.81 30.25 28.76 29.69
Report Health as Fair (%) 14.28 15.45 15.06 18.24 16.42 17.48
Report Health as Poor (%) 8.01 8.50 6.97 8.76 7.92 7.30
People that Self-Report
believing they will live until 75 67% 66% 68% 67% 68% 67%
People that Self-Report
believing they will live until 85 49% 46% 49% 48% 57% 57%
Average Hospital Stay (Days) 2.11 2.42 2.11 2.64 3.03 3.44
(%)People that was hospitalized 11.44 18.21 19.00 20.70 21.05 22.70
Average Doctor Visits (#) 3.63 5.66 6.92 7.35 7.73 8.23
(%)People that went to a doctor 79.15 88.08 87.36 86.77 85.56 83.81
having excellent, very good, and good health. Furthermore, individuals with full coverage report
being less healthy than the those with partial or no coverage. A possible explanation for that is that
individuals that have better health insurance coverage use more health services and therefore have
a better assessment of their health status. Alternatively, it can be that those who are in worse health
make sure to be more fully covered.
In order to investigate if individuals that have no health insurance coverage use less health care
services, we calculate health care utilization by level of coverage across waves. Table 11 reports
the results. These numbers are calculated across waves and conditional on reporting having used
each speciﬁc health care service. For example, 53.28% of the hospitalizations over the 1992-2002
period were fully covered by health insurance providers, while only 4.21% had no coverage at
all. It is striking to see that less than 10% of the individuals that have seen a doctor, or have had
a surgery, or have received any type of nursing home, or home medical care did not have any
kind of health insurance. This is to say that more than 90% of the individuals that received health
care are covered by some health insurance. This ﬁnding strongly suggests that individuals that are
uninsured are really constrained in their use or their ability to be receiving health care.
Table 11 also shows the average days in the hospital and number of doctor visits by the level of
coverage. We ﬁnd that individuals with no health insurance have less hospital stays and less doctor
38Table 10: Self-Reported Health by Level of Coverage in Doctor Visits
Full Partial None
Health Limitation Precludes Work (%) 41.3 49.5 8.0
Health Limits Ability to Work (%) 35.4 55.3 8.4
Health Limits Ability in general (%) 32.8 58.0 8.3
Average Self-Reported Health 2.34 2.17 2.20
(1=Excellent, 5=Poor)
Report Health as Excellent (%) 23.4 67.3 8.8
Report Health as Very Good (%) 22.8 68.7 8.0
Report Health as Good (%) 25.3 63.5 10.5
Report Health as Fair (%) 33.0 56.0 10.5
Report Health as Poor (%) 42.1 46.8 9.7
People that Self-Report
believing they will live until 75 15.7% 27.1% 23.9%
People that Self-Report
believing they will live until 85 17.5% 26.0% 21.0%
Table 11: Health Care Utilization by Level of Coverage
Full Partial None
Hospital Stay (%) 53.28 40.16 4.21
Average Days in the Hospital 1.31 1.26 1.02
Nursing Home (%) 60.94 19.20 9.38
Doctor Visits (%) 27.04 62.86 9.46
Average Number of Doctor Visits 6.67 6.52 4.22
Outpatient Surgery (%) 46.70 46.91 3.89
Dental Care (%) 13.39 44.24 41.92
Prescription Drugs (%) 13.18 69.54 17.02
Home Medical Care (%) 76.07 15.46 5.19
visits, again reinforcing the idea that they are constrained in their utilization of health services.
Table 12 further explores this issue by showingthe level of health insurance coverage of people
who have seen a doctor or have been hospitalized by waves. Again we ﬁnd that a relatively small
fraction of the individuals that have used those services had no health insurance coverage. This is
especially true for hospital stay, but may reﬂect the fact that individuals with no coverage would
do everything they can to avoid the expensive service of hospitalization.
In order to further investigate the linkage between health care utilization and insurance cover-
age, Tables 13 and 14 provide an overview of transitions from one insurance one state to another.
The Tables also provide detailed information about the interactions between the transitions and
utilization of health care, measured by the number of doctor visits and hospital stays.
Table 13 shows that the insured state is quite persistent across waves, especially in the last three
39Table 12: Health Insurance Coverage by Wave
Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Doctor Visits
Full 23.77 25.62 27.28 31.82
Partial 62.04 63.28 64.77 61.34
None 13.47 10.60 7.52 5.92
Hospital Stay
Full 47.54 53.14 56.56 55.53
Partial 44.03 40.37 37.92 38.59
None 6.23 4.70 3.59 2.50
Table 13: Health Insurance Coverage Across Waves
Waves 1&2 Waves 2&3 Waves 3&4 Waves 4&5 Waves 5&6
Insured to Insured (#) 8255 7758 8224 8258 8263
(%) 73.9 74.6 82.1 85.9 90.5
Insured to Uninsured (#) 1045 681 433 216 216
(%) 9.4 6.5 4.3 2.2 2.4
Uninsured to Insured (#) 766 1247 630 689 326
(%) 6.9 12.0 6.3 7.2 3.6
Uninsured to Uninsured (#) 1110 716 725 449 324
(%) 9.9 6.9 7.2 4.7 3.5
waves of the HRS. However, a signiﬁcant fraction of individuals, between 6% and 16% depending
on the wave, do change their insurance status. This is especially clear in the transitions from Wave
1 to Wave 2 and from Wave 2 to Wave 3. Table 14 and its various panels explores the possible
interactions between these transitionsand health care use, trying to uncover a pattern of health care
utilization that is correlated with these changes in insurance coverage.
Panel A of Table 14 shows the percentage of individuals who increased their number of doctor
visits as a function of the evolution of their insurance status. We can observe that those who
transit from the no insurance state to the insurance state are very similar in their behavior to those
that remained insured. Moreover, those who lose their insurance are clearly less likely to see the
doctor more often than before. Panel B of Table 14 presents the complementary results, with the
percentage that decreased their number of doctor visits. Here the main ﬁnding is that for most
waves those that lose their insurance are clearly more likely to go to the doctor less.
Panels C and D of Table 14 present similar evidence but for hospital stays for this same popu-
lation. Again the insurance transitions explain quite well the differential utilization of health care
over time.
40Table 14: Health Care Utilization and Health Insurance Transitions
Panel A: % in each group that increased their number of Doctor Visits
Waves 1-2 Waves 2-3 Waves 3-4 Waves 4-5 Waves 5-6
Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins
Ins 61.5 58.3 50.1 46.3 44.8 38.0 44.3 35.7 44.5 30.2
Unins 60.9 54.5 52.8 39.8 44.6 37.7 45.9 41.0 45.9 38.4
Panel B: % in each group that decreased their number of Doctor Visits
Waves 1-2 Waves 2-3 Waves 3-4 Waves 4-5 Waves 5-6
Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins
Ins 22.5 21.7 32.6 34.3 39.0 42.1 39.9 41.48 39.3 51.0
Unins 22.7 21.3 29.9 33.8 35.4 36.5 37.0 35.5 37.8 36.1
Panel C: % in each group that increased their number of Hospital Stays
Waves 1-2 Waves 2-3 Waves 3-4 Waves 4-5 Waves 5-6
Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins
Ins 15.3 15.2 14.7 12.6 15.6 13.2 15.9 14.4 17.5 8.8
Unins 18.8 11.0 15.2 8.5 17.5 8.4 16.1 9.4 16.3 9.0
Panel D: % in each group that decreased their number of Hospital Stays
Waves 1-2 Waves 2-3 Waves 3-4 Waves 4-5 Waves 5-6
Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins Ins Unins
Ins 7.5 6.9 11.7 11.2 12.8 13.4 14.4 15.7 13.9 9.3
Unins 8.4 4.1 10.1 8.7 10.0 10.2 10.2 8.7 10.1 8.0
415 Out-of-PocketHealthExpenditures: Non-parametricandPara-
metric Analysis
This section examines the distribution of out-of-pocket health care costs, conditional on the type
of insurance coverage. We use two approaches to examine how the health insurance coverage im-
pacts the distribution of out-of-pocket health care costs. The ﬁrst approach involves estimating a
kernel density of the cost of health care services, separately for six mutually exclusive categories
of insurance coverage. As in Section 2, the categorization is based on the highest level of insur-
ance available to the individual, (1) Employer provided, (2) Private or spouse other than Medigap,
(3) Medigap, (4) Medicare, (5) Medicaid, and (6) No Insurance. Therefore, a respondent with both
Medicare and employer provided insurance is assigned to the ﬁrst category. The second approach
is based on the work of Rust and Phelan (1997), who concluded that out-of-pocket health cost
were best modeled with a mass point at a given cutoff and with a Pareto distribution above this
cutoff point. In this paper we estimate the Pareto distribution of total out-of-pocket health costs,
conditioning on a range of demographic, health, insurance coverage, and health care utilization
variables.
5.1 Non-parametric density estimates
In Figures 5.1 we estimate kernel densities (based on Epanechnikov kernel function) for the total
out-of-pocket costs, drug costs, hospitalization, and doctor visit and dental costs, conditional on
types of insurance. We pool the data from all 6 waves, and deﬂate the out-of-pocket costs in order
to take inﬂation into account.
The density estimations for total out-of-pocket costs show that uninsured respondents are more
likely to incur large costs in catastrophic health events. The order of the insurance types in terms of
the lowest costs, based on covering costs of up to $800 is: employer, private, Medicaid, Medicare,
Medigap, and Unions. For costs higher than $1,200, Medicaid has the best coverage, as indicated
by the estimated lower area below the Medicaid curve for values above that threshold. A rather
surprising result is that for costs higher than $2,600, the estimated density for the uninsured falls
below Medigap. We have checked if this is due to having a low number of observations in that
interval, which could make the results inaccurate. We ﬁnd that the number of observations for the
uninsured category with costs greater than $ 2,600 is 388, and for Medigap is 510. Therefore, the






































































Figure 5.1: Kernel density estimations of out-of-pocket costs
results do not suffer from the small cell-count problem. In addition, the estimated density for the
uninsured falls below Medicare at around $3,600.
There might be two explanations for this phenomenon. First, the populations being compared
can be quite different, with those on Medicare and Medigap belonging to a considerably older
pool, that is more likely to have health problems. Second, it might be due to selection bias. That is,
individuals who expect catastrophic costs in the future, due to their medical history, would avoid
being uninsured.
Next, we decompose the total out-of-pocket costs into drug costs, doctor visits, and hospital-
ization costs. The estimated distributions for the drug costs in the upper-right-hand corner of Fig-
ure 5.1 indicate that the distribution for the uninsured is close to a uniform. Hence, the selection
43bias discussed above, does not seem to be present for drug costs. In addition, employer-provided
insurance has the best coverage for high costs of drugs, and this might be because most of the em-
ployees have the option to get prescription coverage for a small additional amount to their regular
premiums. Medicare and other government-provided coverages do not cover prescription drugs
(other than certain cancer drugs) so their distributions are somewhat close to uniform as well.
In the lower-left-hand corner of Figure 5.1 we plot the density estimates for the hospitalization
costs. Employer-provided insurance and Medigap have the best coverage for hospitalization costs.
Their distributions are almost totally ﬂat after a value of between $200 and $250. Medicare and
Medicaid, however, pick up the costs that are higher than $500.13 Private insurance has the worst
coverage of all plans, even worse than uninsured for high hospitalization costs. This can again be
an evidence for self-selection. That is, the respondents with private insurance, which usually does
not cover hospitalizations, who tend to have worse health condition than the uninsured, pay higher
out-of-pocket costs than the uninsured respondents. Hence, individuals anticipating long stays in
hospital end up obtaining some supplementary insurance that cover the hospitalization costs.
The lower-right-hand corner of Figure 5.1 shows evidence supporting that generally believed
fact Medicaid has generous doctor visit and dental coverage. All other insurance look rather simi-
lar, with employer-provided insurance having better coverage for low costs, and private insurance
having the worst for high costs.
5.2 Parametric Model: Estimates using a Pareto Distribution
Following the insights from Rust and Phelan (1997), we ﬁt a conditional Pareto distribution to
the data on out-of-pocket health costs in the HRS. This alternative approach is motivated by the
fact that the distribution of out-of-pocket health costs, as was seen in the earlier charts, tends to
peak at relatively low levels. This represents the relatively low recurring costs associated with
regular, preventative medical care; i.e. co-pays for check-ups, or the occasional purchases of drug
prescriptions. In analyzing out-of-pocket health care, the more pressing issue is the occurrence of
extremely high out-of-pocket health costs, triggered by some catastrophic negative health shock.
This could consist of expensive hospital stays, high levels of prescription drug costs, and other
expensive services.
13 In fact the deductible for hospitalization costs of Medicare Plan A is around $700-800for the 1990-2000period,
and around $40-$100 for Plan B in the same period.
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Figure 5.2: Non-parametric vs Pareto estimation of total out-of-pocket costs
In Figure 5.2 the Pareto distribution, for out-of-pocket health costs abovea givencutoff level, is
compared to an estimate of a non-parametric kernel density. As can be seen, both in the graphical
results and the results from the Chi-square test (which has a small value compared with its degrees
of freedom), the Pareto distribution provides a superior match. Given that a Pareto distribution
provides a better ﬁt to the distributionof out-of-pocket health care costs, the next step is to estimate
a conditional Pareto distribution model. This will allow us to determine what factors lead to a
higher instance of excessive out-of-pocket health care costs.
Table 15 below reports the results from the estimation of the conditional Pareto distribution
model. The demographicvariables includedare: age, age-squared and sex. The variablescapturing
health status include: self-reported health status, and whether health limits work. Health care
utilization is captured by: the number of hospital stays, and doctor visits in a given year. The ﬁnal
set of variables reﬂects the level of insurance coverage: no insurance, Medicare, Medigap, private
insurance, and employer-provided insurance (with Medicaid as the left-out category). Unlike the
previous analysis, the insurance coverage variables (with the exception of no insurance) are not
mutually exclusive.
45Table 15: Estimation of Pareto Distribution of Total Out-of-Pocket Costs
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard Error
Constant 0.771694 0.666989
Age -0.019150 0.021677









































Health Limit Work -0.029054 0.026852
Log Likelihood -8.4344671
Total Observations 15221
* : coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better
In interpreting Table 15 it is important to remember the shape of the Pareto distribution. The
two free parameter in the Pareto distribution are the cutoff value, here set arbitrarily at $500, and
the a value. The smaller a the fatter the tails of the distribution. The conditional a values are
found by taking the exponent of the average values of the independent variables multiplied by the
coefﬁcients. Given this structure, a negative coefﬁcient value reduces a, indicating fatter tails and
a higher likelihood of incurring large health care costs.
One of the most signiﬁcant factors in the conditional Pareto distribution is the presence of
employer-provided insurance. Access to employer-provided insurance results in a signiﬁcantly
higher value of a and, hence, a signiﬁcantly thinner tail of the distribution. Of the other insurance
parameters, only the presence of private insurance and no insurance are signiﬁcant. Both coef-
ﬁcients are negative, implying that those with private insurance and no insurance will also have
a greater likelihood of facing substantial out-of-pocket health costs. The ﬁnding regarding those
without insurance is rather expected, but the fact that those with private insurance also are at a
higher risk of very high health care costs is evidence of substantial self-selection, and possible ad-
verse selection (see Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for an up to date discussion of adverse selection
46issues in health insurance markets) in health insurance.
Respondents who are relatively unhealthy and expect high out-of-pocket health costs (and can
afford it) purchase the more expensive private health insurance. Respondents who are relatively
healthyand expect lowout-of-pocket healthcost, or cannot afford it, forgo the expenseof healthin-
surance, puttingthemselvesat higher ﬁnancial riskincase a catastrophicevent. It isalsointeresting
to note the lack of signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients for both Medicare and Medigap. Respondents on
Medicare do not have a greater likelihood of facing high out-of-pocket, and neither do respondents
with Medigap.
In analyzing the impact of health status on the distribution of out-of-pocket health cost, we see
that the measure of self-reported health status is signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcient for health-limiting
work is insigniﬁcant. Respondents who report poor health status have a signiﬁcantly higher proba-
bility of incurring large out-of-pocket health costs relative to those reporting excellent health. The
presence and signiﬁcance of employer-provided insurance might explain the insigniﬁcance of the
health-limiting work variable. The coefﬁcients for the measures of health care utilization are both
signiﬁcant and have the expected signs. The negative coefﬁcients in the estimation results indicate
that the probabilityof incurring large out-of-pocket health costs increases as the number of hospital
and doctor visits increase.
These ﬁndings regarding the impact of health status and health care utilization are not particu-
larly stunning or unexpected. However, the fact that they are intuitive and match our prior beliefs
gives some credibility to the estimated model and provides some conﬁdence in the results for the
level of insurance coverage. The key result from these Pareto distribution estimates is that re-
spondents with private insurance have a higher probability of incurring large out-of-pocket health
costs.
We ﬁnish this section with some comparative static using the insights from Table 15. In Ta-
ble 16 we report the value of a for the conditional Pareto distribution, and the probability of incur-
ring in health care costs above $10,000, conditional o a particular set of exogenous of individual
characteristics. Notice that as explained above, a lower value of a implies a higher probability of
incurring high levels of health care costs. We can see, for example, that someone reporting being
in poor health has a probability of around 10.5% of incurring in health costs above $10,000, while,
other things equal, someone reporting being in excellent health, only has a 4.7% probability of
incurring costs above that threshold. We can also see that staying in the hospital for 10 days multi-
47Table 16: Estimate of Pareto Cofﬁcient Under Different Coditions
Value of Alpha Probability
￿ $10
￿ 000
Conditional Alpha 0.9165 7.01%
Alpha w/ poor self reported health 0.8194 10.48%
Alpha w/ excellent self reported health 1.0178 4.66%
Alpha w/ no hospital stays 0.9478 6.17%
Alpha w/ 10 hospital stays 0.5127 41.99%
Alpha w/ no doctor visits 0.9657 5.74%
Alpha w/ 25 doctor visits 0.8508 9.19%
Alpha w/ 120% Average Positive Wealth 0.8796 8.15%
Alpha w/ 80% Average Positive Wealth 0.8771 8.24%
Alpha w/ 120% Average Income 0.9093 7.22%
Alpha w/ 80% Average Income 0.9073 7.27%
Alpha w/ no ins 0.8349 9.82%
Alpha w/ ins 0.9242 6.79%
Alpha w/ medicare only 0.8912 7.77%
Alpha w/ medicare and medigap 0.8585 8.90%
Alpha w/ emp. ins 0.9489 6.14%
Alpha w/o emp. ins 0.8972 7.58%
Alpha w/ health limitations 0.8990 7.53%
Alpha w/o health limitations 0.9255 6.75%
plies by seven the probability of facing that level of health care costs compared with someone that
did not stayed in the hospital at all in the previous year. Interestingly, other things equal, average
income has relatively little effect on the probability of incurring in those high health care costs,
likely indicating that the other controls explain most of the differential costs by income levels. The
table also showsthat those with employerprovided insurance are the ones facing the lowestrisks of
high health care costs, and that health limitations have a weak effect compared with self-reported
health measures.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive basic statistical analysis of the health care insurance for
a sample of older Americans in the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). We characterize and
examine the type of health coverage that HRS respondents had in the 1992 to 2002 period. We
also present estimates of discrete choice models, which make an attempt in understanding the
nature of health coverage and its determinants. We also closely examine the health care cost and
utilization and provide parametric and non-parametric estimates for out-of-pocket costs on various
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We ﬁrst document the movement of retirees from employer sponsored and private plans to
government plans in retirement as they reach eligibility age. We ﬁnd that a large proportion of
the HRS respondents go through periods, of varying length, without any kind of health coverage.
We show in details how both the cost and consumption of health care services vary with the type
of insurance coverage they individuals have. Speciﬁcally, respondents with no insurance visit the
doctor one-forth as often as those with private insurance and are more likely to report declines in
health status. A detailed analysis of the distribution of health care cost show the importance of
prescription drug costs in the overall cost of health care.
While our results are certainly suggestive of major problems caused by the rapid escalation of
health care costs in the U.S., it is much harder to draw ﬁrm conclusions from this analysis regard-
ing welfare and “causality”. It is certainly tempting to classify persistently uninsured individuals
as “health insurance constrained” (as deﬁned, for example in the Rust and Phelan analysis, as in-
dividuals who have no opportunity to obtain health insurance at a reasonable price). Yet, the HRS
survey does not collect sufﬁcient information for us to be able to determine the individual’s“health
insurance opportunity set.” In particular, we are unable to determine whether individuals who do
not have health insurance are voluntarily uninsured (i.e. they chose not to purchase health care
coverage even they it was feasible for them to do so) or whether they are constrained. That is, they
either have a pre-existing condition and no insurance company will insure them, or that the cost of
getting insurance is prohibitively high. Between these two extremes is a much more murky “grey
zone” of individuals who do have several more or less satisfactory insurance alternatives, but at
prices that they may regard as too high in relation to the coverage that is provided. It is not clear
whether or not we should classify individuals in this intermediate category as “constrained” and it
is harder to evaluate the welfare consequences of the lack of fairly priced insurance.
To some extent not being insured might reﬂect a conscientious decision to go without insur-
ance. This, in turn, might reﬂect the outcome of a rational “risk/return” tradeoff made by the
individual. The high premiums charged by insurance company may simply be passing on the
high cost of health care, which is not necessarily the fault of the insurance provider. As we noted
above, a recent Kaiser Family Foundation Survey suggests that the majority of Americans who are
without insurance coverage are uninsured “voluntarily”. That is, they could have purchased health
coverage, but evidently chose not to do so due their evaluation that the beneﬁts it provides is not
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We cannot directly observe the menu of various health insurance plans and their corresponding
premiums that an individual could have chosen from. Hence, we cannot directly evaluate how
manyindividualsare constrained. Amongthose who are unconstrained we cannot directly measure
how many individuals have made a “rational” decision not to purchase health care coverage, and
how many have made a short-sighted or irrational decision to go without coverage.
In future work we will seek out additional sources of data, such as the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey maintained by the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and
use this information to supplement the HRS data in order to make statistical inferences about the
reasoning that lead some individuals to be insured and others not. In particular, we plan to use an
elaborated version of the life-cycle model, similar to models developed by Rust and Phelan (1997),
van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2002), Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2004), French (2005), and
particularly the very ambitious work of Khwaja (2004). In this model we plan to integrate Social
Security, disabilityand Medicare into a detailed life-cycle model that accounts of (1) stochastically
evolving health status, and (2) the role of medical care to restore/repair health problems a person
may experience over their life-cycle.
Nevertheless, this paper makes an initial examination that provides a very informative picture
of the evolution of health insurance coverage, out-of-pocket health insurance costs, and health,
over the decade from 1992 to 2002 as individuals in the HRS transitioned from work into retire-
ment. Our ﬁndings are likely to be of independent interest to policy makers. They also provide an
important set of “stylized facts” that the planned life-cycle models will need to match, if they were
to provide good approximations to actual behavior.
Ultimately some more advanced type of life-cycle model will be necessary to address many of
the most difﬁcult health policy issues, such as an analysis of the beneﬁts and costs of extending
Medicare coverage to earlier age groups, or of restricting access to Medicaid. There is only so
far that a descriptive empirical analysis can go in terms of addressing concrete policy questions.
However, we have provided detailed assessment about the degree of success of Medicare and
Medicaid in terms of provision of health care and reduction in ﬁnancial risk to the least well off
members of the HRS cohort.
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